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Standing for Standing Rock?:
Vindicating Native American Religious
and Land Rights by Adapting New




On February 23, 2017, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
(“Tribe”) was forced to disband its nearly year-long protest
against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which
threatened the integrity of its ancestral lands.  The Tribe sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but the court ruled against
the Tribe and failed to protect its interests.  While the United
States was forcibly removing Indigenous protesters, other coun-
tries were taking steps to protect Indigenous populations.  In un-
precedented legislative action, New Zealand took radical steps to
protect the land and cultural rights of the Indigenous People of
New Zealand, the Maori, by passing the Te Awa Tupua (Whan-
ganui River Claims Settlement) Act.  Through this act, New Zea-
land granted legal personhood to the Whanganui River and
established a new legal paradigm for protecting Indigenous peo-
ples’ unique cultural and land rights.
This Comment discusses how, historically, the United States’
legal system has failed to articulate and protect Native Ameri-
cans’ unique cultural, religious, and land rights.  This Comment
analyzes the existing framework in American jurisprudence that
could underpin the potential adoption of a legal innovation simi-
lar to the Te Awa Tupua Act in the American context.  This legal
framework includes extending standing to natural objects and
creating special legislative carve-outs to protect Native American
cultural and religious rights.
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson Law, 2019.  For
my father, who taught me to write, and my mother, who taught me to listen.
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Finally, after analyzing how the Te Awa Tupua Act func-
tions, this Comment advocates for adopting a legislative frame-
work similar to the Te Awa Tupua Act to ensure that the unique
cultural, religious, and land rights of Native Americans are prop-
erly vindicated in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 2017, the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers granted the Dakota Access Company an easement under
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK309.txt unknown Seq: 3 24-APR-19 7:38
2019] STANDING FOR STANDING ROCK? 787
Lake Oahe on the Missouri River.1  This easement was the final
regulatory stamp needed to complete the Dakota Access Pipeline,
and construction began immediately.2  This confluence of legal de-
feat and quick construction effectively ended the months-long pro-
test at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation—the largest Native
American protest movement in recent history.3
The very next day, in a final act of resistance, the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.4  The Tribe claimed that the completion of
the pipeline was a violation of their rights under the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act.5  The pipeline and the oil it carried, the Tribe
1. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp.
3d 77, 82 (D.D.C. 2017).
2. See Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline Fight,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2017), https://n.pr/2yA5fxC [https://perma.cc/D63Y-
VKG2].
3. See Dakota Pipeline: What’s Behind the Controversy?, BRIT. BROADCAST-
ING CORP. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://bbc.in/2fIMscy [https://perma.cc/2CRV-AWFM].
With an estimated 10,000 participants at its peak and roughly 200 native groups
represented, the impact of the protest is difficult to overstate. Id.  The movement
began in April 2016 when Standing Rock Sioux tribal members established camps
at sacred sites near the proposed Dakota Access Pipeline route. See Leah Don-
nella, At the Sacred Stone Camp, Tribes and Activists Join Forces to Protect the
Land, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2016), https://n.pr/2G4fyAq [https://perma.cc/
ZPS4-FT4R].  At that time there had already been a rather convoluted months-
long discussion between the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Army Corps of
Engineers about the proposed route’s environmental and cultural impact. See
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7–8
(D.D.C. 2016).  The Tribe claimed the Army Corps had failed to properly consult
the Tribe concerning the pipeline. Id.  As the protest movement grew, the move-
ment attracted support from thousands of people from Native American groups
across the country to other social reform movements, including Black Lives Mat-
ter. See Leah Donnella, The Standing Rock Resistance Is Unprecedented (It’s Also
Centuries Old), NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 22, 2016), https://n.pr/2DWeVZ0 [https://
perma.cc/J64Q-KYPQ].  In December 2016, despite winning a legal challenge
against the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Army Corps of Engineers announced it
would not grant the requested easement. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F.
Supp. 3d at 7–8; see also Nathan Rott & Eyder Peralta, In Victory for Protestors,
Army Halts Construction of Dakota Pipeline, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://n.pr/2D35x2s [https://perma.cc/B77J-AKYJ].  However, in 2017, after the
Trump Administration took office, the Army Corps reversed course and granted
the easement. See Charlie Northcott, Dakota Access Pipeline: Is the Standing Rock
Movement Defeated?, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://bbc.in/
2GjmvN1 [https://perma.cc/F2YT-5CUB].  In the wake of this defeat, the protest
camp was completely emptied by the end of February 2017. See Mitch Smith,
Standing Rock Protest Camp, Once Home to Thousands, Is Razed, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2lMUrrb [https://perma.cc/E2EZ-N262].
4. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
5. Id. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2018).  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides that the government
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argued, would pollute the ritual purity of the Missouri River waters,
thereby effectively prohibiting the Tribe’s ability to exercise its
traditional religious practices.6  The motion was denied7 and, in due
time, crude oil began to flow.8
However, while the United States was promoting the interests
of enterprise over those of Indigenous peoples and the environ-
ment, novel legal developments were happening across the globe.9
On March 20, 2017, New Zealand passed the Te Awa Tupua (Whan-
ganui River Claims Settlement) Act.10  This act settled 140 years of
negotiations between the Maori and New Zealand’s government
concerning rights related to the Whanganui River.11  While such a
resolution of differences is important, the most significant legal de-
velopment of the Act was the grant of legal personhood to the
Whanganui River as a means of vindicating Maori cultural and re-
ligious rights.12
This Comment argues that the United States should adopt a
legislative model similar to that of New Zealand’s Te Awa Tupua
Act.  Such a model would provide much needed protections to a
particularly nebulous area of American law:  the interaction be-
tween the American legal system and Native American cultural, re-
ligious, and land rights.
This Comment begins with a brief introduction of the legal the-
ories that support granting legal standing to natural objects like
land or rivers.13  This Comment then discusses the distinct religious
expressions of Native American peoples and how protecting these
unique expressions of faith has historically required specific con-
gressional carve-outs.14  Part II also gives a brief introduction of the
rights held by legal constructs like corporations:  a legal fiction anal-
cannot substantially burden an individual’s religious exercise even through laws of
general applicability. Id. § 2000bb-1(a).  The government may still act in such a
way to substantially burden an individual if the government can demonstrate that
the burden furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing so. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
6. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
7. Id. at 100.
8. See Merrit Kennedy, Crude Oil Begins to Flow Through Controversial Da-
kota Access Pipeline, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1, 2017), https://n.pr/2SJWzOF
[https://perma.cc/HK6M-STTV].
9. See Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as
Human Being, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2017), https://bit.ly/2nHobni [https://perma.cc/
A67U-3ETL].
10. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, (N.Z.).
11. See Roy, supra note 9.
12. See Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 3, sub 2, s 71.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B–C.
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ogous to Te Awa Tupua.15  Part III examines New Zealand’s Te
Awa Tupua Act and analyzes its structure, purpose, and effects.16
Part III then argues that application of a similar model in the
United States would not only be possible, but a uniquely beneficial
way of vindicating Native American cultural, religious, and land
rights.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. Natural Objects Do Not Have Standing: But Congress Can
Grant Rights to Natural Objects
Within U.S. jurisprudence, land and natural objects generally
do not have intrinsic rights.18  Nor has any court acted conclusively
to extend rights or standing to land or natural objects.19  Despite
this reality, activists continue to advocate and litigate in an effort to
expand rights to land and the natural world.20
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1979) (stating that
courts have not adopted “the principle that natural objects are given independent
‘rights’ and ‘standing’”); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE
STANDING?: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5–7 (3d ed. 2014) [herein-
after STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?] (arguing that although under cur-
rent law the environment is not granted standing or rights, such rights should be
granted to the environment in order to protect the integrity and well-being of the
natural world).
19. See, e.g., Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp., No. 14–209ERIE, 2015 WL
6002163, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2015) (declining to determine whether a river
ecosystem seeking to intervene in the action had standing under the law), aff’d sub
nom. Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp. E. Run Hellbenders Soc’y, Inc., 658 F.
App’x 37 (3d Cir. 2016).  While not deciding the validity of the Little Mahoning
Watershed’s ability to bring suit, in dicta the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit questioned whether the Little Mahoning Watershed was an appropriate
party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it lacked a capacity
to sue or be sued. See Grant Twp. E. Run Hellbenders Soc’y, 658 F. App’x at 38
n.2; see also Ezer, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
20. See generally Complaint, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-
02316 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 4284548.  The suit was later dis-
missed with prejudice in December 2017. See Press Release, Office of the Colo.
Att’y Gen., Statement from Attorney General Cynthia H. Coffman on the United
States District Court’s Dismissal with Prejudice of Colorado River Ecosystem v.
The State of Colorado (Dec. 4, 2017), https://bit.ly/2MIJ6DW [https://perma.cc/
D2F7-5NZ3]; see also STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?, supra note 18.
Stone argues that under the current legal system, polluted or degraded land and
ecosystems fail to realize the benefits of the legal system’s protections, and to rem-
edy this shortcoming the law should grant the environment rights and adopt land
“guardianship” positions to advocate for the “land’s rights in the land’s name.” Id.
at 7–9.
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One of the clearest examples of this advocacy can be found in
Christopher Stone’s formative work Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?.21  Stone’s book articulates an in-depth case for granting rights
to natural objects.22  Stone supports his argument with legal as well
as moral imperatives.23  Stone grabs one’s attention by highlighting
the fact that all the people who now enjoy rights did not always
enjoy those rights—for example, slaves and women.24  However,
Stone downplays the radical nature of his syllogistic thesis by re-
minding the reader that many non-human entities possess rights
too.25
Stone further argues that natural objects should have rights be-
cause under the current system courts cannot directly or adequately
address the harm polluters and other degrading entities pose to nat-
ural objects—as opposed to individuals.26  Specifically, Stone high-
lights how courts grant relief only to a person negatively impacted
by the aforementioned polluter, instead of the natural object it-
self.27  As a remedy to this shortcoming, Stone urges courts to
adopt legal “guardianships” of the environment’s rights similar to
the guardianships parents have over minor children.28  Further, to
protect substantive rights belonging to the environment, Stone pro-
poses a system analogous to tort and copyright infringement claims:
shift the costs of violating the land’s rights to the violator.29
Indicative of how influential Stone’s work is, Stone’s advocacy
for the intrinsic rights of land has been widely recognized and dis-
cussed by political columnists, judges, and lawmakers.30  Stone’s
21. See generally STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?, supra note 18.
22. See generally STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?, supra note 18.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 2.  While Stone’s argument for extending legal standing to nature is
in its own right bolstered by what he claims to be an analogous context in the
historical process of slowly extending legal rights to natural persons like slaves and
women, this Comment’s thesis diverges from Stone’s argument by recognizing that
any extension of legal rights to natural objects must be derivative of natural per-
sons. See id.; see also infra Part III.
25. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?, supra note 18, at 1–2.
26. Id. at 7, 13–15.
27. Id. at 13–15.
28. Id. at 8–9.
29. Id. at 14.
30. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (relying
on Stone’s earlier work to find that Article III of the Constitution does not pro-
hibit Congress from authorizing suits in the name of natural objects); Ezer v. Fuch-
sloch, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1979); see also 118 CONG. REC. 18340,
18400–13 (1972) (statement of Sen. Hart); Colman McCarthy, The Price of Pro-
gress: Alaska, Thy Name Is Victim, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 1980), https://wapo.st/
2EoFX9Z [https://perma.cc/XB32-TXED].
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work was even persuasive enough to influence Supreme Court Jus-
tice Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.31
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club sought declaratory,
preliminary, and injunctive relief to prevent the U.S. Forest Service
from permitting the Walt Disney Company to develop the Mineral
King Valley nature preserve as a ski resort.32  The Sierra Club
claimed it had standing because it had a special interest in the integ-
rity of the nature preserve.33  The Court found that the Sierra Club
did not have standing to protect the nature preserve because it had
failed to allege injury specific to it or its members.34  The Court
reasoned that a “mere interest” in a problem is insufficient to estab-
lish an individual’s standing.35
Justice Douglas proposed the creation of “a federal rule that
allow[s] environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies
or federal courts” by conferring “standing upon environmental ob-
jects to sue for their own preservation.”36  Justice Douglas sup-
ported this admonition by reasoning that standing granted to
inanimate objects like ships and corporations would be analogous
to any standing potentially granted to rivers, mountains, or mead-
ows.37  He concluded that if the natural objects were able to bring
cases on their own behalf, the burden to act as the natural objects’
spokesperson would fall on an individual who has an “intimate rela-
tion” with the natural object.38
Justice Douglas’s words did not fall on deaf ears.  In response
to the majority’s opinion that the Sierra Club could not bring a
claim based on the non-economic injury derived from environmen-
tal degradation,39 Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act to provide any citizen the right to bring suit against any
31. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972)).
32. Id. at 728–30 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 736.
34. Id. at 739.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 741–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 742–43.  Justice Douglas concluded that standing for a natural object
would be akin to the standing held by ships and intangible “persons” such as cor-
porations and corporations sole. Id.
38. Id. at 745, 752.  Specifically, “people who have so frequented the place as
to know its values and wonders will be able to speak for the entire ecological com-
munity.” Id. at 752.
39. Id. at 739 (majority opinion) (“[A] mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘ad-
versely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA.”).
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polluter or administrator failing to perform its duties under the
act.40  While Congress did not take as radical a step as Justice
Douglas proposed, it effectively demonstrated that it has the power
to expand who has standing in environmental degradation cases.41
Congress’s action authorizing citizen suits on behalf of the environ-
ment bolsters the idea that Congress can legislatively confer rights
or standing to land entities.
Justice Douglas’s words have been persuasive in other courts
as well.  In Ezer v. Fuchsloch,42 the California Court of Appeals
declined to grant standing to a pine tree that was the object of a
restrictive covenant property dispute.43  On appeal from an injunc-
tion mandating the trimming of the disputed pine tree, the appel-
lants argued that the trial court had failed to properly consider the
pine tree’s rights.44  The court found that the trial court did not err
in declining to extend rights to the pine tree.45  Relying on Justice
Douglas’s admonitions, the court reasoned that environmental pro-
tections come from legislative enactment, and in the absence of leg-
islative action, the court should not take judicial action to create
such rights in the pine tree.46  The court implicitly reasoned that the
legislature has the authority to extend rights and protections to the
environment through legislative enactments.47
Nor has the concept of legislatively conferred standing been
limited solely to the environment.  Courts considering whether ani-
mals have standing to bring a claim have also adopted the reasoning
that legislative action can grant standing to unlikely parties.48  In
40. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92–500, § 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2018)).
41. See Fairview Twp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 773 F.2d 517, 523 n.10 (3d Cir.
1985) (“The aspect of § 1365 that attracted the most attention in Congress was the
conferring of standing upon citizens who could demonstrate only injury in fact that
was non-economic.  As such the citizens’ suit provision was a response to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. Morton . . . .”).
42. Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 1979).
43. Id. at 493.
44. Id. at 488.
45. Id. at 493.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2004); see
also Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993) (“If Congress and the President intended to
take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal enti-
ties to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly.”); see also In re Nonhuman
Rights Project Inc. v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 916 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (finding that
the “question of ‘whether the law should accord legal personality . . . in most in-
stances devolves on the Legislature’” (quoting Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972))). But see Coho Salmon v. Pac. Lumber
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Cetacean Community v. Bush,49 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that the sole plaintiff, the Cetacean Commu-
nity, “all of the world’s whales, porpoises, and dolphins,”50 did not
have standing to bring a claim against the U.S. Navy.51  In deter-
mining whether the cetaceans had standing, the court first ad-
dressed whether American jurisprudence prohibited suits by
animals.52  The court concluded:
[W]e see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from au-
thorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it pre-
vents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such as
corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of juridi-
cally incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, and mental
incompetents.53
The court then sought to resolve the issue of whether Congress
had enacted legislation “granting standing to an animal by statuto-
rily authorizing a suit in its name.”54  The court concluded no such
statutory authorization existed.55
These cases and Congress’s actions post-Sierra Club illustrate
that, within American jurisprudence, Article III does not specifi-
cally prohibit land and natural objects from acquiring standing.56
Rather, the limitation on land bringing a claim in its own right is a
lack of authorization by statute.57
B. Unique Relationship Between Native Americans and Land
Stone’s claim that land and natural objects should have recog-
nized intrinsic rights is not entirely new; Native Americans have
Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1008 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“[T]he court notes that, to
swim its way into federal court in this action, the coho salmon would have to battle
a strong current and leap barriers greater than a waterfall or the occasional fallen
tree.”).
49. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
50. Id. at 1171.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1176.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1179.
56. Id. at 1175–76; see also Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D.
Haw. 1991) (finding the attorney naming the Hawaiian crow as a plaintiff was not
subject to discipline for filing a frivolous suit because while the plaintiffs “have
cited no controlling case law directly supporting the [Hawaiian crow’s] right to
appear as a named plaintiff, neither have the . . . defendants presented any direct
authority to the contrary” (emphasis added)).
57. See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175–76; see also Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 160
Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1979).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK309.txt unknown Seq: 10 24-APR-19 7:38
794 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:785
long recognized the intrinsic value land has in its own right.58  This
recognition that land has intrinsic value may best be illustrated by
Chief Seattle’s commentary about the threatened loss of his ances-
tral lands.
In a letter attributed to Chief Seattle, he depicts land in a fa-
milial light and as deserving respect.59  Chief Seattle, worried by the
overtures of the federal government to buy his land, poetically
highlights the difference between Western concepts of land and
those of his people.60  He opines that many Native American peo-
ples have an intricate connection to the land; a connection best de-
scribed as a familial relationship.61  The rivers and the sky are
brothers, and the earth is a mother to Native Americans.62  As such,
the rivers, sky, and earth deserve the same kind of respect and kind-
ness one would give to one’s own kin.63
The Native American prophet Smohalla’s resistance to adopt-
ing agriculture and mining on native lands exemplifies the unique
relationship of respect Native Americans have with land.64
Smohalla equated farming with taking a knife to his mother’s bo-
som and mining with digging up his mother’s bones.65  According to
Smohalla, farming and mining were so offensive to the respect
owed to the land that if he were to adopt these practices, he would
be unable to find any solace from the earth after his death.66
While land certainly garners respect from Native Americans,
many Native Americans also value land for its religious signifi-
cance.67  For many Native Americans, land is sacred and imbued
58. See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NA-
TIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 974 (LexisNexis ed., 7th ed. 2015).
59. See Letter Attributed to Chief Seattle, in MANY HEAVENS, ONE EARTH:
READINGS ON RELIGION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 101 (Clifford C. Cain ed., 2012).
Nor is a familial relationship limited to the land; according to Chief Seattle, the





64. See David Kinsley, Native American Religions, in MANY HEAVENS, ONE
EARTH: READINGS ON RELIGION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 107, 112 (Clifford C.
Cain ed., 2012).
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id.  Not all Native Americans, however, were as averse to agriculture as
Smohalla. Id. at 111–12.  For example, the Hopi and Navajo regularly cultivated
corn. Id.  Despite the use of agriculture, it was still seen as a sacred and holy act
that required observance of rituals and traditions. Id.
67. Id. at 112; see also Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 82 (D.D.C. 2017) (discussing how the Lakota
people believe the construction of an oil pipeline beneath Lake Oahe would dese-
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with the divine.68  Within the Hopi, Apache, and Koyukon Tribes,
historical tribal lands, religious praxis, and culture are intricately
connected.69  This connection is so enmeshed that the land and re-
ligion are inseparable.70
The American legal system has struggled to account for the
importance of land to Native American religions.  The number of
legal challenges to land development projects brought by Native
Americans under the Free Exercise Clause71 illustrates how insepa-
rable land and religion are for many Native Americans.72
crate the water and “render them unsuitable for use in their religious
sacraments”).
68. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (accepting the
plaintiff’s contention that the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona were central to Hopi
and Navajo religion and were the home of specific deities).
69. See Joel Martin, The Land Looks After Us, in MANY HEAVENS, ONE
EARTH: READINGS ON RELIGION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117, 118–19 (Clifford C.
Cain ed., 2012).
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  The protec-
tions of the Free Exercise Clause, however, have been divided into protection of
religious belief and protection of religious practice. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990).  While the protection of belief is unlimited, not all religious
practices enjoy the same broad protection. Id.  A strict ban on a religious practice
because that practice is associated with religious belief clearly violates the Free
Exercise Clause. Id. However, a law that is otherwise generally applicable and
that only hinders religious practice as an incidental result of its application does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 878.
72. See Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
see also Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738–39 (bringing a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause to enjoin the government from developing ski resorts and using treated
waste water on the San Francisco Peaks, mountains sacred to the Hopi and Navajo
people); see also Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980) (bringing
a claim under the Free Exercise Clause against the government’s action in dam-
ming a river that “drowned” Navajo gods, denied Navajo access to prayer sites,
and permitted tourists to desecrate the sacred site); see also Sequoyah v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1160–62 (6th Cir. 1980) (bringing a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause against the Tennessee Valley Authority’s construction of a
dam that would submerge traditional Cherokee lands with religious and cultural
significance); see also Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 787–88 (D.S.D. 1982)
(bringing a claim under the Free Exercise Clause against the State of South Da-
kota for constructing access roads around Bear Butte, a sacred site to the Lakota
and Tsistsistas peoples).  Although this Comment does not discuss property rights
in much detail, it is important to note that property law is a significant factor in
many of these suits, despite often being brought under the First Amendment. See
Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting
a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063–65 (2005).  Car-
penter argues that the federal government’s ownership of many sacred native lands
presents unique legal issues related to the exercise of Native American religion.
Id. at 1069.  In her article, Carpenter highlights how courts have used property law
to justify adverse decisions against Native Americans’ Free Exercise Clause claims.
Id. at 1072–73, 1074, 1083–85.  As such, Carpenter advocates for a new Native
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For example, in Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n,73 the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Tribes claimed that the Free
Exercise Clause prevented the Federal Government from con-
structing a road and permitting logging in the Chimney Rock area
of a national forest.74  The Tribes argued that the road and logging
would seriously harm their religious practice because the activities
would irreparably damage sacred land central to their belief sys-
tems and impair the successful religious use of the land.75
The Supreme Court, however, declined to find that the govern-
ment had violated the Tribes’ rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.76  The Court reasoned there was no violation of the Free
Exercise Clause because the construction of the road and authori-
zation of logging would neither coerce the Tribes to violate their
religious beliefs nor penalize the Tribes by denying them rights and
benefits enjoyed by other citizens at large.77
The Court found that the Tribes’ efforts to enjoin the road con-
struction and logging amounted to an attempt to exact a specialized
carve-out for themselves, instead of an attempt to prevent the gov-
ernment from inhibiting their exercise of religion.78  The Court rea-
soned that if it upheld the Tribes’ claims, the Tribes would acquire
“de facto beneficial ownership” of public lands and divest the gov-
ernment of land rights.79  The Court gave only scant consideration
to the fact that the integrity of the land was so vital to the Tribes’
religious practices that government action damaging the land
through logging and road construction would make the religious
use of the land ineffectual.80
However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan concluded
that the majority opinion restricts Free Exercise Clause protections
to such an extent that it allowed federal land use decisions to effec-
tively destroy Native American religious practices.81  Importantly,
in reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on the significant
differences between Western religious practices that do not require
American property interest in federally owned sacred sites that draws heavily on
common law non-owner rights, the public trust doctrine, and international human
rights law. See id.
73. Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
74. Id. at 441–42.
75. Id. at 442.
76. Id. at 545–46.
77. Id. at 449.
78. Id. at 451–52.
79. Id. at 453.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id. at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the preserved integrity of or access to specific lands and Native
American religious practices that do.82
Justice Brennan further critiqued the majority’s reasoning that
the Free Exercise Clause prohibited only government actions com-
pelling “affirmative conduct inconsistent with religious belief” and
found that the majority’s opinion impermissibly narrowed the Free
Exercise Clause by valuing the form of governmental action over
the effect of government action.83  Justice Brennan relied on the
reasoning of Wisconsin v. Yoder,84 in which the Court focused its
Free Exercise Clause analysis on the impact government actions
would have on the religious practice itself.85  By neglecting to con-
sider the impact the government’s action would have on the Tribes’
religious practice, Justice Brennan argued, the majority failed to
consider the Court’s own precedent in Yoder.86
Unfortunately, although many Native American peoples be-
lieve land has inherent sacred and religious importance, the integ-
rity of this sacred land is generally not protected under the First
Amendment.87
C. Congressional and Executive Action Addressing the
Uniqueness of Native American Cultures
Despite the U.S. government’s atrocious record dealing with
Native Americans,88 there has been some détente between Native
American tribes and the U.S. government over the past half-cen-
tury.89  Attempts to rectify the United States’s sordid relations with
Native American tribes have come primarily in the form of congres-
sionally enacted protections of Native American cultural and relig-
ious expression, as well as executive programs of consultation with
and exemptions for Native American tribes.90
82. Id. at 460–61.
83. Lying, 485 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85. Lying, 485 U.S. at 466–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 467–68.
87. See supra notes 64–86.
88. See Lindsay Glauner, Comment, The Need for Accountability and Repara-
tion: 1830–1976 The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implemen-
tation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 929–34 (2002) (describing the history of the Indian Removal
Act of 1830 and forced removal of Native Americans thereafter).
89. See discussion infra Part II.C.1–2.
90. See discussion infra Part II.C.1–2.  This section addresses only the positive
actions Congress and the executive branch have taken to make amends for past
atrocities, in part because the courts have rarely stepped into a role of judicial
activism to ensure the cultural and religious rights of Native American peoples.
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the First Amend-
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1. Congressional Action
Much like the executive branch, Congress’s historical relation-
ship with America’s Indigenous Nations has not been a model of
humanity or fairness.91  Throughout the period of westward Ameri-
can expansion, Congress enacted legislation authorizing and aiding
the dispossession of Native American lands and infringing on Na-
tive American rights.92  However, over the past few decades, Con-
gress has made attempts to rectify some of these wrongs committed
by the United States.93  For example, Congress has enacted legisla-
tion protecting Native American gravesites and establishing proto-
cols for the return of Native American exhumed ancestors.94
Additionally, Congress has acted to protect unique Native
American culture and religious expression after the judiciary has
failed to do so.95  In Employment Division v. Smith,96 the Supreme
Court held that an Oregon law prohibiting the consumption of pe-
yote was constitutional.97  The Court, unconvinced by the respon-
dents’ argument that the Oregon law prohibited their free exercise
of religion as members of the Native American Church,98 reasoned
that a neutral law that did not intentionally prohibit a particular
ment does not protect Native Americans who use peyote in religious ceremonies
from states’ inadvertently discriminatory laws); Lying, 485 U.S. at 451–52 (holding
that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by the Government’s building of a
road through sacred lands despite finding the Government’s action would “virtu-
ally destroy” the Native Americans’ religious practice); Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831) (finding that the Cherokee Nation did not have standing to
bring claims in the United States Supreme Court against the U.S. Government
because the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state). But see Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the State of Georgia could not extend its
own laws into the Cherokee Nation’s territory).  In Worcester, the judiciary, rather
than the legislative or executive branches, protected the right to self-determination
of Native American tribes in the United States. See Glauner, supra note 88, at
932–33.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s ruling did not prevent the forced re-
moval of the Cherokee Nation by President Andrew Jackson; this forced removal
would infamously become known as the “Trail of Tears.” Id. at 933.
91. See discussion supra Part II.D.1–2.
92. See Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1831); see also Indian Ap-
propriation Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871).
93. See H.R.J. Res. 46, 111th Cong. (2009) (recognizing the suffering of Na-
tive Peoples due to the actions and policies of the U.S. Government); see also Act
of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479
(2018)) (abandoning federal policy of forced assimilation).
94. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2018)).
95. See Native American Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2018)).
96. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
97. Id. at 890.
98. Id. at 874, 878.
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religious activity but merely had an “incidental effect” on the relig-
ious activity did not violate the First Amendment.99
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith
prompted Congress to amend the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act.100  The amended act specifically protects Native Ameri-
can use of peyote for religious purposes and prohibits states from
penalizing Native Americans on account of such religious use.101
The amendment codified Congress’s finding that the religious use
of peyote was “integral to [Native Americans’] way of life” and the
perpetuation of Native American culture.102
Pointedly, Congress directly addressed the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.103  Congress found that the
Supreme Court’s ruling raised uncertainties as to whether or not
the law protects a right to religious use of peyote.104  This ambigu-
ity, Congress feared, would only lead to further stigmatization,
marginalization, and discriminatory treatment of Native Ameri-
cans.105  In short, Congress’s amendments to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act affirms that the United States legislature
can create laws sensitive to Native American forms of religious
expression.106
2. Executive Action
Congress is not alone in attempting to redress the wrongs com-
mitted against Native Americans; the executive branch has also
taken steps towards repairing relationships with Indigenous Peoples
in America, primarily through the process of consultation.107
In 1971, the Nixon Administration implemented the first at-
tempts at consultation between a federal agency and Native Ameri-
99. Id. at 878.
100. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat.
3125 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1996–1996b (2018)).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a.
102. Id. § 1996a(1).
103. Id. § 1996a(4).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1996a(5).
106. See John Celichowski, A Rough and Narrow Path: Preserving Native
American Religious Liberty in the Smith Era, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 31 (2000).
Celichowski also notes that in response to Smith the Oregon legislature created an
exception for Native American religious use of peyote from its ban on peyote use.
Id.
107. See generally Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417 (2013).  Signifi-
cantly, despite the executive branch’s efforts to engage in consultation with Native
Americans, what consultation means and what the duty of consultation requires is
still unclear and lacks an operational definition. Id. at 453.
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cans.108  As part of the implementation, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) solicited feedback from federally recognized tribes
on the agency’s new procedures for fostering greater Native Ameri-
can participation in the BIA’s personnel management decisions.109
Part of this feedback became new BIA guidelines establishing a
consultation policy on personnel matters.110  As articulated by the
guidelines, consultation required the BIA to consider the view of
tribal governing bodies and provide these governing bodies with
pertinent information.111   Unfortunately, after the feedback, the
BIA failed to comply with its own newly adopted consultation
policies.112
In 2000, the Clinton Administration also attempted to institu-
tionalize consultation with tribal leaders through an executive order
titled “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Govern-
ments” (“Consultation Order”).113  The Consultation Order’s goal
was to “establish regular and meaningful consultation and collabo-
ration with tribal officials in the development of Federal policy” as
well as to “strengthen the United States government-to-govern-
ment relationships with Indian tribes.”114  To achieve these goals,
the Consultation Order required all federal agencies to implement
consultation processes with Native American tribal officials.115
The Consultation Order required each federal agency whose
regulatory policies had “tribal implications” to establish a proce-
dure of “meaningful and timely input by tribal officials.”116  Addi-
tionally, the Consultation Order directed agencies responsible for
formulating and implementing policies to encourage Native Ameri-
can tribes to develop their own policies and to defer to such Native
American developed policies as much as possible.117  But most in-
dicative of the Administration’s intention to recognize and protect
cultural differences was the Consultation Order’s mandate requir-
ing agencies to use more flexible policy approaches to Native
American tribes seeking waivers of statutory or regulatory
requirements.118




112. Id. at 437.
113. See Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 67,250.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 67,251.
118. Id.
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Compared to Nixon-era attempts at consultation, the Consulta-
tion Order increased actual collaboration between the United
States and Native American tribal leaders.119  However, the consul-
tation process was not without problems.120  Tribal leaders found
the new processes ineffective and uncoordinated.121  Even if the va-
lidity of the agency consultation processes was challenged, the
agency consultation policies only offered limited redress for Native
Americans because these policies did not have the force of law.122
The Obama Administration also sought to foster consultation
between the executive branch and Native American tribes.123  In
2013, the Administration issued an executive order titled “Estab-
lishing the White House Council on Native American Affairs”
(“White House Council Order”).124  The White House Council Or-
der authorized the Council to coordinate policy developments with
the Domestic Policy Council.125
On the international level, the Obama Administration indi-
cated its willingness to address past wrongs when the United States
officially reconsidered its opposition to the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).126  In so
119. Compare Routel & Holth, supra note 107, at 436–39 (indicating that con-
sultation with Native American tribes during the Nixon era was limited to person-
nel policies within the BIA), with id. at 442–44 (discussing how under the Clinton
Administration consultation procedures expanded to all pertinent federal
agencies).
120. See Routel & Holth, supra note 107, at 444–45.
121. Id. at 445.
122. See River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2010).  The Court stated:
To have the force and effect of law, enforceable against an agency in fed-
eral court, the agency pronouncement must (1) prescribe substantive
rules—not interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice—and (2) conform to certain
procedural requirements.  To satisfy the first requirement the rule must
be legislative in nature, affecting individual rights and obligations; to sat-
isfy the second, it must have been promulgated pursuant to a specific stat-
utory grant of authority and in conformance with the procedural
requirements imposed by Congress.
Id. (quoting United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136
(9th Cir. 1982)).
123. See Establishing the White House Counsel on Native American Affairs,
Exec. Order. No. 13647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 39,541.
126. See Press Release, U.S. Mission Geneva, Ambassador Susan E. Rice on
Indigenous Issues (Apr. 20, 2010), https://bit.ly/2Sr8Gmw [https://perma.cc/P2VK-
TXD7].  The UNDRIP is a non-binding international mechanism that comprehen-
sively sets out the rights of Indigenous Peoples. See G.A. Res. 61/178, annex, Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous People (Mar. 6, 2007).  For example, the
UNDRIP specifically recognized Indigenous Peoples’ rights to practice their cul-
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doing, the Administration publicly affirmed its commitment to con-
sulting with Native American tribes to overcome the “legacy of bit-
ter discrimination and sorrow that the first Americans still live
with.”127
In short, despite the executive branch’s shortcomings in pro-
tecting Native American rights and culture, the executive branch
has made attempts to improve the quality and frequency of consul-
tations with Native Americans and to ameliorate the tensions aris-
ing from differences between Native American culture and federal
regulations.
D. Legal Personhood Is a Legal Construct
The final idea to consider is that legal personhood or personal-
ity is a legal construct.  Legal personhood is a tool that confers
rights and duties on persons.128  Persons are not only natural per-
sons—human beings—but also artificial persons.129  Artificial per-
sons are entities that are created by law and given rights and duties
akin to those of natural persons.130  To fully illuminate this discus-
sion, this Comment will briefly discuss a common and ubiquitous
artificial person:  the corporation.131
1. Corporations Have Been Granted Rights and Standing
Through Legislative and Judicial Acts
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a corporation as an entity “es-
tablished in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic per-
son that has a legal personality distinct from the natural persons
who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the
tural traditions, to have access to their religious and cultural sites, and to “partici-
pate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights.” Id. at 5–6. It
is worth noting that although the UNDRIP is non-binding, it has been interpreted
as authoritative in some international jurisprudence. See Cal v. Att’y Gen. of Be-
lize, Claim Nos. 171 & 172, ¶ 131 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2007) (Belize) (finding that the
UNDRIP “reflected general principles of international law on indigenous peoples
and their resources” and that Belize’s vote in favor of the Declaration bound Be-
lize not to deviate from these principles).
127. See Press Release, supra note 126.
128. See Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 283 (1928); see
also Personality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
129. Billings v. State, 6 N.E. 914, 914 (Ind. 1886) (“Persons are of two kinds,
natural and artificial.”).
130. See Artificial Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) [herein-
after Artificial Person].  However, not all agree that the rights of artificial persons
should have a theoretical and analogous basis in the rights of natural persons. See
generally Alexis Dyschkant, Note, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It
Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2075 (2015).
131. See Artificial Person, supra note 130.
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legal powers that its constitution gives it.”132  In other words, corpo-
rations are creatures of statute that owe their existence and powers
to the will of governing bodies.133  As such, the law of the jurisdic-
tion of incorporation shapes the purposes and forms of a particular
corporation.134  Today, corporations benefit from laws that grant
them perpetual existence, thus promoting particular objectives be-
yond the natural lifespan of a human being,135 and other powers
like the ability to contract and sue or be sued.136
However, the modern corporation did not always exist in its
present form.137  Nor have corporations always had the rights that
they enjoy today.138  Rather, corporate “personhood” has devel-
oped through an evolving process.139  Over the past century, legisla-
tures expanded corporate powers as a means of driving economic
growth:  for example, relaxing corporate purpose restrictions.140
132. Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
133. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
to its very existence.”); see also Corporation (Corporate or Incorporate), THE
WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (Stephen M. Shep-
pard ed., 2012) [hereinafter Sheppard].  Sheppard’s description is helpful:
Corporations may take many forms, but every corporation is a creature
of statute, limited in its powers to those allowed by statute in the jurisdic-
tion in which it is incorporated and further limited to the powers and
purposes in the charter granted to it by the government of that
jurisdiction.
Id.
134. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 637 (stating that the purposes of a
corporation are “such as the government wishes to promote”).
135. Id. at 636 (describing corporate perpetual existence as a means of facili-
tating corporate management and simplifying the ownership of property that
would otherwise have to be transferred to each successive member of the
corporation).
136. See Sheppard, supra note 133.
137. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Neofeudalism: The Surprising Foundations
of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169–70 (2017) (dis-
cussing medieval corporations like the church, city municipalities, and universities,
the modern corporation’s ancestors, as groups claiming autonomy from the
Crown’s claim to exercise rule over their affairs).
138. See David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist Joker: The
Strange Origins, Disturbing Past, and Uncertain Future of Corporate Personhood in
American Law, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643, 656 (2011) (discussing how for the
early part of American jurisprudence, corporations did not have constitutional
rights).
139. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 138, at 644–47 (giving a brief overview
of changing corporate constitutional rights legal theory throughout American
history).
140. See Greenwood, supra note 137, at 176.
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More importantly, corporations’ constitutional rights have ex-
panded over the course of American jurisprudential history.141  The
first, and perplexing, instance in which constitutional rights were
extended to corporations was in the case of Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,142 which came before the Supreme
Court in 1886.143  Oddly, the published opinion of Santa Clara in-
cluded, without explanation and contrary to common practice,
Chief Justice Waite’s comment prior to oral argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly applied to corporations.144  Implicit
in this proclamation is that the “persons” who states cannot deny
the equal protection of law includes corporations.145  This peculiar
editorial decision, in effect, extended Fourteenth Amendment con-
stitutional protections to corporations by mere proclamation rather
than legal reasoning.146  Significantly, this proclamation opened the
door to extending more constitutional rights to corporations over
the subsequent decades, including freedom of speech and freedom
of religion protections.147  Suffice it to say, corporations now enjoy
many constitutional rights that American courts have extended to
them.148
This brief overview, for the purpose of this Comment, is suffi-
cient to recognize that artificial persons can possess rights tradition-
ally thought to belong to natural persons.  There is no reason that
lawmakers could not extend analogous rights to Native American
sacred lands.
141. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 394 (declaring the Fourteenth Amendment applied to corporations
in the prefatory materials without indicating how the Court reached such a legal
conclusion outside of the official opinion of the Court).
145. Id.  The relevant text stated:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that
it does.
Id.
146. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 138, at 666.
147. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772–75 (2014)
(finding that the Free-Exercise Clause protects the religious activities of closely
held for-profit corporations). See also Gans & Kendall, supra note 138, at 674–81.
The author argues that this proclamation was the “capitalist joker” inserted into
“the deck” that many later Supreme Court benches relied on to extend constitu-
tional rights to corporations between 1895 and 1933. Id.  According to the author,
the erroneous extension of constitutional rights culminated in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. FCC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which extended First
Amendment free speech protections to corporate entities. Id. at 692–98.
148. See sources cited supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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2. Corporation Sole: The Special Religious Corporation
Within the context of religious expression, artificial persons
have taken on a unique form as corporations sole.149  The concept
of a corporation sole traces its roots to the common law of En-
gland.150  Historically, the corporation sole was a means of manag-
ing the affairs and property holdings of hierarchical religious
organizations.151  In effect, the corporation sole incorporates the of-
fice of a religious leader and any successors in order to establish the
perpetuity of the religious organization.152
Today, the corporation sole has, like other corporations, be-
come a creature of statute.153  In California, for example, a religious
leader of any denomination may form a corporation sole to manage
the affairs of the organization154 by simply filing articles of incorpo-
ration.155  Incorporation grants the corporation sole legal powers to
contract, sue and be sued, own property, and receive gifts and be-
quests.156  Importantly, these powers exist even if there is a vacancy
in the office because the corporation sole has perpetual
existence.157
III. ANALYSIS: INTERNATIONAL MODELS AS POTENTIAL
VINDICATORS OF INDIGENOUS RELIGIOUS AND LAND
RIGHTS
The United States is not the only nation to struggle with pro-
tecting the religious and land rights of marginalized Indigenous
peoples.158  For potential inspiration, the United States can and
149. See Berry v. Soc’y of Saint Pius X, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 581 (Ct. App.
1999).  “A corporation sole consists of only one person at a time, but the corpora-
tion may pass from one person to the next without any interruption in its legal
status.”  Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78,
84 n.1 (1st Cir. 2013).  However, the person of the individual officer embodying the
corporation sole is distinct from the person of the corporation sole itself. See 1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER & BASIL JONES, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 50 (West 2018).
150. See Berry, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 582.
153. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 10000–10015 (Deering 2019).
154. See id. § 10002.
155. Id. § 10003.
156. Id. § 10007.
157. Id. § 10008.
158. See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples), The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, ¶¶ 4, 58–62, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/27/52/Add.2 (July 4, 2014) (recognizing the history of human rights violations
and commending the current land claims settlements between the Canadian gov-
ernment and Indigenous peoples, but also critiquing the Canadian government’s
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should look to other international legal developments that recog-
nize and protect Indigenous peoples’ inextricably connected relig-
ious and land rights.
This section first discusses a recent and innovative develop-
ment in international law that has extended protections to Indige-
nous peoples by granting legal personhood to the Whanganui River
in New Zealand.159  Second, this section evaluates the feasibility of
adopting a similar legal scheme in the United States and makes sug-
gestions for what a similar scheme may look like.160
A. New Zealand’s Novel Model of Protecting Indigenous Rights:
Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement)
Act
Much like the United States, New Zealand has struggled to
protect the rights of Indigenous peoples in New Zealand:  the Ma-
ori.161  Despite historical shortcomings of land grabbing and treaty
violations, New Zealand has recently strived to uphold its founding
treaty obligations by:  (1) establishing a tribunal to settle grievances
for prior breaches of the treaty; (2) settling land claims arising from
the treaty; and (3) using the treaty to interpret legislation.162  While
all of these actions of reconciliation are necessary to vindicate the
rights of the Maori people, the New Zealand legislature took radi-
cal action to further protect Maori rights by enacting the Tu Awa
Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act (the “Act”).163
The radical nature of the Act is that it seeks to protect the
religious and cultural significance the Whanganui River holds for
local Maori Tribes by creating a legal person, Te Awa Tupua, that
comprises the Whanganui River.164  The Act defines Te Awa Tupua
continued use of monetary payment schemes to extinguish native land rights); see
also Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Her
Visit to Australia, ¶¶ 6, 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/46/Add.2 (Aug. 8, 2017) (recog-
nizing the destructive impact European settlement had on Aboriginal peoples
whose religion and culture was deeply connected to the land and the continued
lack of consultation between Aboriginal peoples and the government).
159. See infra Part III.A.
160. See infra Part III.B.
161. See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples), The Situation of Maori People in New Zealand, ¶¶ 6, 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
18/35/Add.4 (May 31, 2011) (finding that despite negotiating a treaty protecting
and enshrining the respective land rights of British settlers and original Maori in-
habitants, the New Zealand government violated the treaty and stripped Maori of
their lands).
162. Id. ¶ 22.
163. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, (N.Z.).
164. Id. at pt 2, s 12.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK309.txt unknown Seq: 23 24-APR-19 7:38
2019] STANDING FOR STANDING ROCK? 807
as “an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui
River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical
and metaphysical elements.”165  The Act further outlines that Te
Awa Tupua, as so defined, “is a legal person and has all the rights,
powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”166
However, a grant of legal personhood to the river without gui-
dance as to how New Zealand law will effectuate the river’s rights
and duties would be disastrous.  Anticipating this problem, the Act
establishes the office of Te Pou Tupua to act on Te Awa Tupua’s
behalf.167 Te Pou Tupua is the “human face of Te Awa Tupua”168
and is empowered by the Act to:  (1) speak on Te Awa Tupua’s
behalf; (2) promote the health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua; (3)
perform landowner functions on behalf of Te Awa Tupua; and (4)
take any other action reasonably necessary to effect any of these
goals.169  In an abundance of caution, the Act even delineates Te
Pou Tupua’s taxable income.170  Te Pou Tupua is, in effect, a guard-
ian or trustee of Te Awa Tupua.
The Act also anticipates that the legal form of Te Awa Tupua
must be flexible as it relates to other acts of the New Zealand Par-
liament.171  Specifically, the Act lays out when Te Awa Tupua
should be treated as an institution,172 a public body,173 a public au-
thority,174 or a corporation.175
To fully understand why New Zealand’s legislature deemed
granting legal personhood to Te Awa Tupua necessary, one must
consider the Act’s purpose.  The Act both establishes legal per-
sonhood in Te Awa Tupua and embodies an official apology,176 rec-
ognizing the unique cultural and religious connection the
Whanganui Maori Tribe has with the Whanganui River.177  Specifi-
cally, the Act codifies Maori cultural and religious beliefs concern-
ing the Whanganui River when it recognizes that “Te Awa Tupua is
a spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the
life and natural resources within the Whanganui River and the
165. Id.
166. Id. at s 14.
167. Id. at pt 3, s 18, subs 1.
168. Id. at s 18, subs 2.
169. Id. at s 19, subs 1, paras a, c–d, i.
170. Id. at s 26.
171. Id. at pt 2, s 17.
172. Id. at s 17, para a.
173. See Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 2, s 17, paras b, g.
174. Id. at paras c, e.
175. Id. at para f.
176. Id. at pt 3, s 70.
177. Id. at s 70, para f; see also s 71; see also pt 2, s 13.
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health and well-being of the [Maori] and other communities of the
River.”178  The relationship between Te Awa Tupua and the Whan-
ganui Maori Tribe is not just one of sustenance emanating from Te
Awa Tupua.179  Rather, the Whanganui Maori Tribe has “an ina-
lienable interconnection with Te Awa Tupua” and has “respon-
sibilit[ies] to Te Awa Tupua in relation to its health and well-
being.”180
This recognition of the Maori’s connection to Te Awa Tupua is
an important conceptual distinction.  The Whanganui River’s legal
personhood as Te Awa Tupua is not a legislative grant of rights to
the river in its own right, but rather a granting of rights and per-
sonhood to the river as derivative of the Whanganui Maori Tribe’s
religious and cultural beliefs.181  Granting Te Awa Tupua legal per-
sonhood is therefore a vindication of Maori “customary rights.”182
B. Transplanting Te Awa Tupua: The Feasibility of the New
Zealand Model on American Soil
While the Te Awa Tupua Act seems radical at first blush, the
Act incorporates many parallel structures that already exist in
American jurisprudence.  As such, the Te Awa Tupua Act is a
framework the United States can integrate seamlessly into its own
jurisprudence to build its own environmental standing laws.  Be-
cause many of the legal concepts that underpin the Act already ex-
ist in American jurisprudence, a similar construct can be readily
adapted to the American context.183
1. A Legislative Solution
American courts have justifiably been cautious about unilater-
ally expanding rights to land, natural objects, or the environment.184
The Te Awa Tupua Act demonstrates how to implement a legisla-
tive conferral of rights upon a natural object.185  Were Congress to
enact a similar legislative model to confer such rights upon lands
178. Id. at pt 2, s 13, para a.
179. Id. at pt 3, s 71, cl 1, para a.
180. Id. at para b.
181. See id. at cl 1.
182. Id. at s 70.
183. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
184. See Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp. E. Run Hellbenders Soc’y, Inc.,
658 F. App’x 37, 38 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (questioning the capacity of a watershed to
join pending litigation as party); see also Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493
(Ct. App. 1979) (stating that courts have not adopted “the principle that natural
objects are given independent ‘rights’ and ‘standing’”).
185. See supra Part III.A.
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deemed sacred by Native Americans, such legislative conferral of
rights would likely raise no objection from the courts.186  Indeed, it
is the courts that have consistently said that the “question of
‘whether the law should accord legal personality . . . in most in-
stances devolves on the Legislature.’”187
Significantly, a legislatively enacted model is the only feasible
model for adopting such a legal development.  In March 2017, an
Indian court unilaterally granted two sacred rivers legal personhood
status.188  In Salim v. State of Uttarakhand,189 the High Court of
Uttarakhand sua sponte declared the Ganga and Yamuna rivers to
be legal persons “with all the corresponding rights, duties and liabil-
ities of a living person in order to preserve and conserve [the riv-
ers].”190  The court reasoned that “juristic persons” was a legal
concept created to serve the needs of society.191  The court further
reasoned that because such large portions of Indian society relied
on the Ganga and Yamuna rivers for physical and spiritual suste-
nance, the well-being of Indian society necessitated that the rivers’
be granted legal personhood as a means of preserving the rivers’
health.192
The High Court’s decision, however, did not stand.193  On July
7, 2017, the Indian Supreme Court stayed the High Court’s rul-
ing.194  While the Indian Supreme Court’s order was silent as to the
court’s reasoning,195 the High Court’s decision left multiple issues
186. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We
see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit in the
name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought in the name of artificial
persons . . . .”).
187. See In re Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 916
(Sup. Ct. 2015) (quoting Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887,
889 (N.Y. 1972)).
188. See generally Salim v. Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL), No. 126 of 2014,
Uttarakhand HC (Mar. 20, 2017) (India), https://bit.ly/2G3DS5m [https://perma.cc/
B69R-XWGZ].
189. Salim v. Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL), No. 126 of 2014, Uttarakhand
HC (Mar. 20, 2017) (India).
190. Id. ¶ 19.
191. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.
192. Id. ¶¶ 17–19.
193. See SC Stays Uttarakhand HC Order on Ganga, Yamuna Living Entity
Status, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DP17Og [https://perma.cc/
CZ38-NGEV].
194. Order of the Supreme Court, Salim v. Uttarakhand, Petition for Special
Leave to Appeal No. 016879/2017, (2017) (India), https://bit.ly/2BeEYay [https://
perma.cc/QG7G-ZLDP].
195. Id.
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unresolved.196  For example, while the High Court declared the riv-
ers to be legal persons with all the corresponding “rights, duties and
liabilities of a living person,” how the rivers would be liable for
their actions was strikingly absent from the High Court’s deci-
sion.197  Would the rivers be liable for property damage caused by
flooding?  Would the rivers be responsible to pay taxes?  Lacking
the greater precision of legislative drafting, the High Court’s grant
of legal personhood to the rivers naturally made implementing the
rivers’ “rights, duties and liabilities” prohibitively unfeasible.198
As the legal experiments in both India and New Zealand
demonstrate, extending legal personhood to natural objects re-
quires a legislative model that specifically lays out the rights, duties,
and liabilities the natural object would have.
2. Land’s Rights Are Derivative of Native American Religious
Rights
Congress can and should implement legislation similar to the
Te Awa Tupua Act.  Congress has a history of taking action to pro-
tect the rights of Native American peoples.199  Congress has acted
decisively and specifically to expand religious protections to Native
Americans.200  One such instance of congressional action was when
Congress, by passing the Native American Religious Freedom
Amendments in 1994, protected the rights of Native Americans to
participate in the religious use of peyote while maintaining their
eligibility for public benefits.201
However, Congress has done little to protect Native Ameri-
cans’ religious connection to their ancestral and sacred lands.202
Adopting a legal framework akin to the Te Awa Tupua Act could
resolve this issue.  Native American religious expression and expe-
rience, like Maori religious expression, is integrally connected to
196. See Salim v. Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL), No. 126 of 2014, Ut-
tarakhand HC (Mar. 20, 2017) (India), ¶ 19.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. See generally Native American Religious Freedom Act Amendments of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996a (2018)).
201. See id.; see also supra Part II.B.
202. See, e.g., Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).  In response to this case, and others like it, there was an unsuccessful at-
tempt in Congress to codify protections for Native American sacred lands. See
Native American Sacred Lands Act, H.R. 2419, 108th Cong. (2003) (protecting
Native American access to sacred sites and avoiding potential damages to sacred
lands).
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the land and environment.203  Were Congress to grant legal per-
sonhood to Native American sacred lands, Congress would be pro-
tecting Native American religious expression in a culturally
sensitive fashion by protecting the integrity of the land that is the
object of Native American faith.204
Additionally, because the legal personhood of sacred lands
would be derivative of Native Americans’ own religious rights,
adopting this legal construct would not have to overcome the con-
ceptual hurdles that Stone encounters in advocating for the intrinsic
rights of the environment.205  Rather, the legal personhood of sa-
cred lands would be, like Te Awa Tupua, an extension of Native
American cultural and religious rights.206
3. An Analogous Form in the Corporation
Finally, there is already an analogous artificial person in Amer-
ican jurisprudence after which Congress could model personhood
for sacred Native American land:  the corporation.  Te Awa Tupua
is, like a corporation, a creature of statute.207  Te Awa Tupua’s
rights, duties, and obligations are statutorily defined.208  It also, like
a corporation, benefits from perpetual existence—a crucial trait for
natural objects with longevity far exceeding the lifespan of a natural
person.209
203. Compare Lying, 485 U.S. at 442 (recognizing the Tribes’ contention that
the Tribes had a deep spiritual connection with the land), and Letter Attributed to
Chief Seattle, supra note 59 (describing animals and the environment as having a
familial connection with himself), with Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims
Settlement) Act 2017, pt 2, s 13 (N.Z.), and id. pt 3, s 70 (recognizing the “integral
connection” of the Maori and the Whanganui River as Te Awa Tupua).
204. See generally Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (bring-
ing a claim under the Free Exercise Clause claiming that the construction of a dam
“drowned” the gods incarnate in the land).  Although beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is worth noting that this Comment’s proposed congressional action
may implicate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of the “establishment of re-
ligion.” See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”).  The question—whether congressional adoption
of legislation similar to the Te Awa Tupua Act violates the Establishment Clause
protections—is ripe for further scholarship.
205. See STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?, supra note 18 and accom-
panying text.
206. See supra Part III.A.
207. Compare Sheppard, supra note 133, with Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 2, ss
12–18.
208. See Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 2, s 14.
209. Compare Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(describing corporate perpetual existence as a necessary tool for facilitating corpo-
rate management), with Te Awa Tupua Act pt 2, s 12 (defining Te Awa Tupua as
the Whanganui River in its entirety).
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Much like the religious subset of corporations, a corporation
sole, Te Awa Tupua also has a religious dimension:210  it is a “spiri-
tual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life and
natural resources within the Whanganui River.”211  Another point
of convergence is the similar purposes of a corporation sole and Te
Awa Tupua:  both manage the affairs of a religious entity.212
However, the most important convergence is that protecting
corporate rights protects the rights of the individuals comprising the
corporation.213  In the case of sacred land, the corporate form
granted to the land would arise out of the individual devotees’ ag-
gregate association.214  Therefore, like extending rights to any other
corporate form, extending rights to sacred land would protect the
rights of the individual believers that give shape to the legal
person.215
4. Implementation: Practical Considerations
One question remains:  what would implementing a statutory
scheme similar to the Te Awa Tupua Act require in the United
States?  This Comment proposes that legislation granting legal per-
sonhood to sacred lands should require the natural objects to have
a distinct and historical personality for Native Americans, establish
a legal representative, and specifically delineated rights and duties.
In both India and New Zealand, the courts and legislature ex-
tended legal personhood to rivers predicated on the fact that these
rivers had a historical and distinct personality associated with
them.216  In the United States, legislation should grant sacred lands
210. Compare Berry v. Soc’y of Saint Pius X, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 581–82 (Ct.
App. 1999) (describing the purpose of a corporation sole as a means of preserving
and managing the affairs of the religious organization), with Te Awa Tupua Act, pt
2, s 13, para a (defining Te Awa Tupua as a spiritual and physical entity).
211. Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 2, s 13, para a.
212. Compare Berry, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581–82 (describing the purpose of a
corporation sole as a means of preserving and managing the affairs of the religious
organization), with Te Awa Tupua Act, pt 2, s 14 (establishing that the office of Te
Pou Tupua will manage the affairs of the entity Te Awa Tupua).
213. See e.g. Citizens United v. FCC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see also Tamara R. Piety, Why Per-
sonhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 372–73 (2015) (arguing that in the
absence of any judicial guidance, the best rational scholars can posit for extending
constitutional rights to corporations is that such an extension protects the rights of
the individuals that make up the corporation).
214. See Te Awa Tupua Act pt 2, ss 12–13.
215. Compare Te Awa Tupua Act pt 3, sub 2, s 71, with Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at
2772–75.
216. See Te Awa Tupua Act pt 2, ss 12–13; see also Salim v. Uttarakhand, Writ
Petition (PIL), No. 126 of 2014, Uttarakhand HC (Mar. 20, 2017) (India), at ¶ 17.
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and rivers personhood only if a distinct personality associated with
the land or river can be shown to exist in Native American culture
and belief.217
Additionally, like the Te Awa Tupua Act, legislation must es-
tablish and empower a legal representative to act on behalf of the
natural object.218  The representative could be an individual or an
office and would act like the natural object’s fiduciary.219  Like Te
Pou Tupua, a tribe associated with the natural object’s legal person
must elect the representative.220  Establishing a legal representative
would resolve the issue of who acts on behalf of and speaks for the
land or river.
Finally, the implementing legislation must also outline the con-
tours of the land or river’s rights, duties, and liabilities.  Failure to
use legislative specificity would result in the ambiguity faced by the
courts in India.221  Instead, New Zealand’s meticulous statutorily
defined rights are the model to follow because of the clarity and
guidance they provide.222
IV. CONCLUSION
The protests at Standing Rock highlighted the continuous fail-
ure of the United States to fully protect the rights of Indigenous
people in America.223  On first consideration, granting legal per-
sonhood to natural objects is a radical proposal to ameliorate this
failure.224  Courts have been justifiably reticent to extend rights and
standing to land, trees, and animals in the absence of legislative ac-
tion.225  However, granting legal personhood to sacred Native
American lands and rivers is not radical when one considers that:
Congress has already enacted legislation granting special protec-
tions to Native Americans,226 Native American religious and cul-
217. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176–77 (10th Cir. 1980).  For
example, the Navajo deity associated with Rainbow Bridge National Monument
would have been a likely candidate for this status prior to its decimation. Id.
218. See Te Awa Tupua Act pt 2, ss 18–19.
219. Id. at s 19, cl 2, para a (mandating that Te Awa Tupua’s representative,
Te Pou Tupua, act in the interests of Te Awa Tupua).
220. Id. at s 20.
221. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part III.A.
223. See supra notes 1–8, 73–86, 88, 92 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. See In re Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 916
(Sup. Ct. 2015) (finding that the “question of ‘whether the law should accord legal
personality . . . in most instances devolves on the Legislature’” (quoting Byrn v.
N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972))).
226. See supra Part II.C.
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tural rights have a unique relationship to nature,227 and other non-
human entities enjoy the legal fiction of personhood.228
In light of these factors, adopting a model like New Zealand’s
Te Awa Tupua Act in the United States to protect the integrity and
well-being of Native American sacred lands is not only possible but
highly beneficial.229  With an innovative legislative act, Congress
could extend broad protections to the environment while acting de-
cisively to protect the interests and rights of Native Americans in a
culturally sensitive manner.  Were Congress to grant standing for
Native American sacred lands it would be taking a colossal step
forward in protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples and the
environment.
227. See supra Part II.B.
228. See supra Part II.D.
229. See supra Part III.B.2.
